

SECRET**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

SUBJECT: (Optional) Countermeasures Macro Resource
Data Study (MRDS)

FROM:
CIA Focal Point Officer

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

3 May 1984

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. DDI/FICG

3E-47, Hqs.

Attn:

2.

3. DDO/CI Staff

2C-43, Hqs.

Attn:

4.

5. DDS&T/AS

6E-38 Hqs.

Attn:

6.

7. C/COMSEC/OC

8.

9. DD/PSI

Attn: C/CD

C/SAG

10.

11. DD/PTAS

Attn: C/ISSG

C/TSD

12.

C/PSD

C/ISB

13.

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

14. REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL

WHEN SEPARATED FROM

SECRET ATTACHMENT

15.

Forwarded herewith is a copy of the MRDS which was sent to the IC Staff on 1 May 1984.

For your information, I have included a Terms of Reference sheet (some of you received one last week) that shows which agencies have been participating.

This Agency is still preparing responses on computer security, counter-ELINT, counter-imagery and OPSEC, but with the exception of Computer Security, the responses are essentially negative

Should you have any questions concerning your submission or deadline dates for those reports still due, please feel free to call me.

SECRET

SECRET1 May 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Executive Secretary
Interagency Group/Countermeasures

ATTENTION:

FROM:

Central Intelligence Agency
Focal Point Officer

SUBJECT:

Countermeasures Macro Resource Data Study

REFERENCES

- A. D/ICS-83-0776 dated 15 December 1983,
same subject
- B. D/ICS-84-0768 dated 2 February 1984, same
general subject

1. Forwarded herewith is the initial Central Intelligence Agency response to the Interagency Group/Countermeasures tasking on the Countermeasures Macro Resource Data Study. The individual Terms of Reference (TOR) are presented in the order outlined in Reference B. Explanatory remarks are included, keyed to each TOR.

° A. COMSEC

No additional comments

° B. TEMPEST

Where cited, these dollar figures
represent 35 percent of the total figures
reflected in the COMSEC data.

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

OS 4 0840

SECRET

SECRET° C. TSCM

It is re-emphasized that Physical Security costs are 40 percent of the total Agency TSCM figures, and that they are reported separately with the TSCM data. Please note that the 40 percent attributable to physical security is double-counted in the Physical Security TOR response and is clearly identified there.

It should be noted that the TSCM TOR response does not call out FY 83 funds for the DCI Security Committee (SECOM.) Those funds, in the amount of were included in the Agency's Office of Security budget.

° D. PERSONNEL SECURITY

This material has been edited to remove internal Agency data not relevant to the purposes of this Study.

° E. PHYSICAL SECURITY

The Security Equipment Program costs identified here are being double-counted, as noted above under the TSCM response.

° F. INFORMATION SECURITY

This TOR has been slightly edited to remove internal Agency data not relevant to the Study. The substance of the submission and its eight attachments remain unchanged.

° G. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

Industrial Security costs for the Office of Logistics Security Staff and the Industrial Security Branch/Physical Security Division/Office of Security have been included here. Industrial security costs for National Programs are not included because they are not incurred on Agency-funded activities.

SECRET

SECRET° H. PORT SECURITY

25X1 The Central Intelligence Agency exercises no Port Security responsibilities and will not be responding to this TOR.

° I. SPACE WARNING MECHANISMS

25X1 Agency resources for Space Warning Mechanisms are all expended within the Directorate for Intelligence.

25X1 2. All Agency components responding to the Study requirements have attempted to reflect accurately the dollar and personnel resources expended or programmed for the three years which the Study covers. The figures for FY 83 are relatively firm, given the vagaries of estimating actual dollar costs when factored against the guidance provided in the TOR documents themselves. The FY 84 allocations have not yet been fully expended, so it is impossible to say just what the actual FY 84 figures will be. We are even more in the dark about FY 85 because Agency budget reviews are still underway and our final authorization figures are not yet known. We are, quite frankly, not sanguine that the results of our Study efforts are at all meaningful as a MACRO Management tool.

25X1 3. Central Intelligence Agency data concerning Computer Security is now being gathered and will be provided in accordance with the Study schedule.

25X1

SECRET

Page Denied

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

TEMPEST

Page Denied

TECHNICAL SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES

~~SECRET~~

It is impossible to accurately reflect the true TSCM costs, because the Technical Security Divisions budget is in fact used not only to provide TSCM services, but to provide physical security equipment, support and services throughout the world.

PROGRAM: Technical Security Countermeasures (TSCM) is a major program of the CIA Office of Security. The program resides in the Technical Security Division, which is responsible for the budget preparation, management and accomplishment of the agency TSCM mission. The operating budget is initiated by TSD and based on a five year projection cycle. The budget is reviewed within the division, presented to the Office of Security for review and ranking against other office requirements. Following this exercise it becomes a part of the overall Office of Security presentation to the Deputy Director for Administration. The various TSCM programs of the budget are again ranked at the DDA level prior to presentation to the Agency's Executive Committee for final formulation and ultimate presentation to the Office of Management and Budget.

The principal action/decision points are the Deputy Director Physical Technical and Area Security, Director of Security, Deputy Director of Administration, Comptroller,* and the Director of Central Intelligence. At each of these levels the program is reviewed, analyzed, and prioritized. Determinations are made as to the relevance of the program and the expenditures of resources both monetary and manpower in relationship to the responsibility for protection of agency facilities both foreign and domestic. During all of the above activities programs such as physical security, computer security, communications security and operational security are taken into account.

* It should be noted that the Comptroller is an Action Office for the Executive Committee. He is not a Decision Point.

Approved For Release 2009/03/13 : CIA-RDP87B01034R000300090005-2

Page Denied

Next 11 Page(s) In Document Denied

PERSONNEL SECURITY

Page Denied

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

PHYSICAL SECURITY

Approved For Release 2009/03/13 : CIA-RDP87B01034R000300090005-2

Page Denied

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

INFORMATION SECURITY

Page Denied

Next 10 Page(s) In Document Denied

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

Page Denied

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied

PORT SECURITY

The Central Intelligence Agency has no input.

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied